In this paper, we consider a two-way relay system where the two sources can only communicate through an untrusted intermediate relay and investigate the physical layer security issue in this two-way untrusted relay scenario. Specifically, we regard the intermediate relay as an eavesdropper from which the information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept confidential, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is essential. We first indicate that a nonzero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in this two-way untrusted relay system even without the help of external friendly jammers. As for the system with friendly jammers, after further analysis, we can obtain the secrecy rate of the sources can be effectively improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, we formulate a Stackelberg game between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme to achieve the optimized secrecy rate of the sources, in which the sources are treated as the sole buyer and the friendly jammers are the sellers. In addition, the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking prices are given, and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. Finally, the simulation results verify the properties and efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg-game-based scheme.
to provide secure communications. This line of work was pioneered by Wyner [2] , who introduced the wiretap channel and showed that when the wiretap channel is a degraded version of the main channel, the two legitimate users can exchange secure messages at a nonzero rate without relying on a private key. In follow-up work [3] , Wyner's result was generalized to a nondegraded discrete memoryless broadcast channel with common messages sent to both receivers and the confidential messages sent to only one of the receivers. In [4] , the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel was studied, and in [5] , the secrecy capacity of the quasi-static fading channel was investigated in terms of the outage probability.
Motivated by the fact that if the wiretap channel is less noisy than the main channel the secrecy capacity will be zero [3] , some recent work has been devoted to overcoming this limitation utilizing relay cooperation, which can mainly be classified into two type methods, i.e., cooperative relaying [6] [7] [8] and cooperative jamming [9] [10] [11] [12] . In [6] [7] [8] , effective Decode-and-Forward (DF)-and Amplify-and-Forward (AF)-based cooperative relaying protocols for an improved physical layer security are proposed. Cooperative jamming is regarded as a promising approach to improve the secrecy capacity by confusing the eavesdropper with codewords independent of the confidential messages [10] . In [9] [10] [11] [12] , several cooperative jamming schemes were investigated for different scenarios to increase the physical layer security. In addition, in [13] and [14] , joint conventional relay and friendly jammer selection schemes were studied to improve the physical layer security for one-way DF relay communications and two-way AF relay communications, respectively.
Untrusted relay channels with confidential messages were first studied in [15] and [16] , where the intermediate relay acts as both an eavesdropper and a helper. In [17] , it is indicated that cooperative transmission, even with an untrusted relay, could be beneficial in relay channels with orthogonal components. In [18] , a two-hop communication system with an untrusted intermediate relay is investigated, and it is shown that a cooperative jammer enables a positive secrecy capacity that would be otherwise impossible. Recently, two-way relay channels [19] [20] [21] have attracted lots of interest from both academic and industrial communities due to its advantage in saving bandwidth efficiently. In [19] and [20] , both AF and DF protocols for one-way relay channels were extended to general full-duplex discrete two-way relay channel and halfduplex Gaussian two-way relay channel, respectively. In [21] , different relay strategies consisting of AF, DF, and Estimateand-Forward for uncoded two-way relay channels were investigated. Although two-way relay systems have received much attention so far, their physical layer security issues, particularly in the two-way untrusted relay scenario, have not been well investigated.
Game theory [22] offers a formal analytical framework with a set of mathematical tools to study the complex interactions among interdependent rational players. Recently, there has been significant growth in research activities that use game theory for analyzing communication networks, mainly due to the need for developing autonomous, distributed, and flexible mobile networks where the network devices can make independent and rational strategic decisions, as well as the need for low complexity distributed algorithms for competitive or collaborative scenarios [23] . In [24] and [25] , some recent studies on signal processing and communication networks using game theory are introduced. In [26] and [27] , game theory is employed to physical layer security to study the interactions between the source and the friendly jammers who can assist the source by distracting the eavesdropper, and some distributed game-based solutions are obtained.
In this paper, we investigate physical layer security issues in a two-way untrusted relay system with friendly jammers. The two sources can exchange information only through an untrusted intermediate relay as there is no direct communication link between them. The untrusted AF relay acts as both an essential relay and a malicious eavesdropper that has the incentive to eavesdrop on the information transmission. For comparison, we first investigate the two-way untrusted relay system without friendly jammers as a special case and find that a nonzero secrecy rate is indeed available, even without the help of external friendly jammers. Optimal transmitting power of the two sources is also derived to maximize the secrecy rate in this special case. As for the system with friendly jammers, after further analysis, we can obtain that the secrecy rate of the sources can effectively be improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, the problem comes to how to effectively utilize the jamming power from different friendly jammers to maximize the secrecy rate. Thus, we formulate a Stackelberg game between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme. In the proposed game, the sources as the sole buyer pay the friendly jammers for the jamming power that confuses the untrusted relay to increase the secrecy rate, whereas the friendly jammers charge the sources with the asking prices for their jamming services. Furthermore, the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking prices are given, and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. In addition, a centralized scheme for the jamming power control problem is also given for comparison with the proposed Stackelberg-game-based distributed updating algorithm. Finally, the properties and efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg-game-based scheme are verified by simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the two-way untrusted relay system with friendly jammers is described, and the corresponding secrecy rate is formulated. In Section III, the two-way untrusted relay system without friendly jammers as a special case is investigated. In Section IV, we propose a Stackelberg type of buyer/seller game to study the optimization problem of physical layer security in the two-way untrusted relay system with friendly jammers and provide a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the optimal solutions. Simulation results are provided in Section V, and the conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a two-way relay scenario consisting of two sources, one untrusted intermediate relay, and N friendly jammers, which are denoted by S k , k = 1, 2, R, and J i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, respectively. Denote the set of indices {1, 2, . . . , N} by N . Each node here is equipped with a single omnidirectional antenna and operates in a half-duplex manner, i.e., it cannot receive and transmit simultaneously. Then, the complete transmission can be divided into two phases. During the first phase, shown with solid lines, both sources transmit their information to the intermediate relay. Simultaneously, the friendly jammers also transmit the jamming signals to distract the malicious relay. During the second phase, shown with dashed lines, the intermediate relay broadcasts a combined version of the received signals to both sources. Note that in the investigated system, there is only one intermediate relay, and we assume that no direct link exists between the two sources. Thus, this sole untrusted relay is necessary for the two-way relaying data transmission. A key assumption 1 we make here is that the sources have perfect knowledge of the jamming signals transmitted by the friendly jammers for they have paid for the jamming service.
Let s 1 , s 2 , and s J i , i ∈ N , denote the signals transmitted by S 1 , S 2 , and the friendly jammers J i , i ∈ N , respectively. Suppose S 1 and S 2 transmit with power p 1 and p 2 , respectively, and the channel gains from the sources to the intermediate relay are h S k ,R , k = 1, 2. Each friendly jammer J i transmits with power p J i , and the channel gain from it to the intermediate relay is h J i ,R , i ∈ N . Here, the channel gains contain the distance-dependent path loss and the small-scale fading. In addition, we assume that the small-scale fading is quasi-static Rayleigh fading with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., the fading coefficients stay the same within one data frame and vary independently from one data frame to another.
In phase 1, the received signal at the intermediate relay can be expressed as
where n r represents the thermal noise at the intermediate relay, which is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance σ 2 , i.e., CN (0, σ 2 ). Furthermore, we assume that the thermal noise at S 1 , S 2 , and R, denoted by n 1 , n 2 , and n r , respectively, are independent identically distributed. In phase 2, the intermediate relay, working in AF mode, amplifies the received signal y r by a factor β and then broadcasts the signal to both S 1 and S 2 with power p r . The power normalized factor β at the intermediate relay can be written as
(2) Then, the corresponding signal received by S 1 , denoted by y 1 , can be written as
Similarly, the signal received by S 2 , which is denoted by y 2 , can be written as
Assuming that both the sources and the friendly jammers are independent, from (1), in phase 1, using the matched filter, 2 the untrusted intermediate relay has the capacity with respect to S 1 and S 2 as
2 For simplicity, here, we use the matched filter for signal detection [28] while many other advanced detectors can be applied and the analysis can be done in a similar way.
where W represents the channel bandwidth, g S 1 ,R
In phase 2, at S 1 , since s 1 as well as s J i , i ∈ N , is known to the source, we haveỹ
Then, the corresponding SNR for the equivalent transmission link from S 2 to S 1 , which is denoted by γ 2 , can be expressed as
where
Similarly, at S 2 , the received signal with s 2 and s J i canceled can be rewritten asỹ
Then, the corresponding SNR for the equivalent transmission link from S 1 to S 2 , which is denoted by γ 1 , can be expressed as
By applying the Shannon capacity formula, the capacities of the two-way relay channel between the two sources, which are denoted by C 1 and C 2 , can be given as
Then, the secrecy rate for S 1 and S 2 can be defined as [5] 
where (x) + represents max{x, 0}. According to [17] and [18] , we have that the defined secrecy rate is achievable in a two-hop secure communication with an untrusted intermediate relay.
As a special case, if the friendly jammers are not used, the jamming power p J i should be set to zero ∀i ∈ N . Thus, from the foregoing derivations, we can obtain the corresponding secrecy rate in this special case without friendly jammers as
III. SECRECY RATE OF TWO-WAY RELAY CHANNEL WITHOUT FRIENDLY JAMMERS
For comparison, we first investigate the special case without friendly jammers in this section. We indicate that there indeed exists a positive secrecy rate for the two-way untrusted relay channel even without the help of friendly jammers. Furthermore, we obtain an optimal power vector of the sources and the relay that maximizes the secrecy rate.
From (15), (16) , and the expressions of K 1 in (10) and K 2 in (8), we can write the probability of the existence of a nonzero secrecy rate as
From (17), we can obtain that the probability of the existence of a nonzero secrecy rate is equivalent to the probability that the inequality p (17) is only a function form representing the probability that event X happens and thus we do not need to provide the detailed closed-form expression of it. Considering the power constraints 0 < p 1 ≤ p max , 0 < p 2 ≤ p max , and 0 < p r ≤ p max , we have that there exists at least one pair of (p r , p 1 , p 2 ) that satisfies p r > max{(Q/p 2 g 2
. Therefore, we have P(C s 1 > 0,C s 2 > 0) > 0 at some power vectors of (p r , p 1 , p 2 ), which actually indicates that a nonzero secrecy rate in the two-way untrusted relay channel is indeed available.
To obtain an optimal power vector of (p r , p 1 , p 2 ) that maximizes the secrecy rate of the two-way untrusted relay channel, we can formulate the optimization problem subject to the individual secrecy rate constraints and power constraints as
From (17), we havẽ
From (15) , (16) , and (18), we can get
wherẽ
SinceF (p r , p 1 , p 2 ) has the same monotonic property asC s under the conditions in (18) , we can transform the optimization problem into
It can be calculated that (∂F (p r , p 1 , p 2 )/∂p r ) > 0 is always established under the conditions in (22) , which implies that F (p r , p 1 , p 2 ) is a monotone increasing function of p r . Therefore, when maximizing the secrecy rateC s , p r_opt = p max , where p r_opt denotes the optimal power transmitted by the intermediate relay. 3 As a result, the optimization problem can further be transformed into maxF (p max , p 1 , p 2 ).
The optimal power solutions of p 1 and p 2 when maximizing the secrecy rate can easily be obtained under different conditions (i.e., g S 1 ,R > g S 2 ,R , g S 1 ,R < g S 2 ,R , and g S 1 ,R = g S 2 ,R ) through the Lagrangian method by solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions [33] . In this paper, subject to the space limit, we omit the detailed computing process and only give the results of the optimal solutions of p 1 and p 2 as follows.
1) For the case that
Meanwhile, if there exists a solution p * 1 ∈ (0, p max ] that satisfies the equation (∂F (p max , p 1 , p max )/∂p 1 ) = 0, then we have p 1_opt = p * 1 . Otherwise, we have p 1_opt = p max . Here, p 1_opt and p 2_opt denote the optimal power transmitted by S 1 and S 2 , respectively. 2) For the case that g S 1 ,R < g S 2 ,R , it yields that p 1_opt = p max . Meanwhile, if there exists a solution p * 2 ∈ (0, p max ] that satisfies the equation (∂F (p max , p max , p 2 )/∂p 2 ) = 0, then we have p 2_opt = p * 2 . Otherwise, we have p 2_opt = p max . 3) For the case that g S 1 ,R = g S 2 ,R , we have that p 1_opt = p max , and p 2_opt = p max . In addition, we verify these optimal power solutions by simulations in different cases shown in Figs. 2 and 3 in Section V, and after further calculation based on the simulation results, we can obtain that the results agree with the optimal power solutions well.
IV. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY GAME WITH FRIENDLY JAMMERS
In this section, through further analysis, we first indicate that the secrecy rate of the sources can effectively be improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, the problem comes to how to control the jamming power from different friendly jammers when optimizing the secrecy rate of the sources. In general, in a cooperative wireless network with selfish nodes, nodes may not serve a common goal or belong to a single authority. Thus, a mechanism of reimbursement to the friendly jammers should be employed such that the friendly jammers can earn benefits from spending their own transmitting power in helping the sources for secure data transmission. For the source side, the sources aim to achieve the best performance of secrecy rate with the least reimbursements. For the friendly jammer side, each friendly jammer aims to earn the payment not only covers its transmitting cost but also gains as many extra profits as possible. Therefore, we employ a Stackelberg game model [22] as a power control scheme jointly considering both benefits of the sources and the friendly jammers. In the proposed Stackelberg game model, the two sources as a unity is the sole buyer that starts the Stackelberg game process, and the friendly jammers act as the sellers; therefore, the sources are treated as the leader, whereas the friendly jammers are the followers. Furthermore, the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking price are investigated, and a corresponding distributed updating algorithm is provided. Finally, a centralized scheme is given for performance comparison.
A. Secrecy Rate Improved Using Friendly Jammers
From (13) and (14), we have
From (23) and (24), we can see that both C k and C m k , k = 1, 2 are decreasing and convex functions of p J i , i ∈ N . However, if C m k decreases faster than C k as p J i increases, C s k may increase in some region of p J i . However, when p J i further increases, both C k and C m k will approach zero. As a result, C s k approaches zero. Compared with (15) and (16), we can obtain that if (σ 2 g J i ,R /p r g S 2 ,R ) < g J i ,R and (σ 2 g J i ,R /p r g S 1 ,R ) < g J i ,R , ∀i ∈ N , i.e., (σ 2 /p r ) < min{g S 1 ,R , g S 2 ,R }, the gain of the secrecy rate will be above zero in some region of the jamming power. Then, the problem comes to how to utilize the jamming power from different friendly jammers effectively to maximize the secrecy rate. Thus, we propose a Stackelberg game model to achieve effective jamming power control in the following sections. Note that synchronization among the sources and the friendly jammers is important in the investigated system with friendly jammers. Much work has been devoted to the synchronization issues among distributed nodes in cooperative networks, for example, in [34] and [35] , effective synchronization schemes among distributed sensors and cooperative relays with low complexity and good performance were proposed. Thus, the synchronization issue among the sources and the friendly jammers can effectively be addressed using methods similar to those proposed in [34] and [35] . However, this is not the key investigated issue in this paper; therefore, we assume that perfect synchronization among the sources and the friendly jammers is implemented in the system.
B. Source Side Game
We consider the two sources as two buyers who expect to optimize the secrecy rate with the help of the friendly jammers, whereas the cost paid for the jamming service, i.e., the jamming power p J i , i ∈ N , should also be taken into consideration. For the source side, we can define the utility function as
where a is a positive constant representing the economic gain per unit rate of confidential data transmission between the two sources, and M is the cost to pay for the friendly jammers.
Here, we have
where m i is the price per unit power paid for the friendly jammer J i by the sources, i ∈ N . When considering the optimal transmitting power vector of S 1 and S 2 , i.e., (p 1 , p 2 ) to achieve the maximum utility in (25) , the jamming power p J i , i ∈ N can be treated as constant since all the nodes transmit with independent power. Thus, we can obtain similar results of the optimal power solutions as given in Section III. However, to obtain the optimal solutions of p 1 and p 2 is not our main purpose in this section. Instead, we formulate the source side game to investigate how to effectively utilize the jamming power from different friendly jammers achieving the maximum utility of the sources.
Then, the source side game can be expressed as
The goal of the sources as buyers is to acquire the optimal jamming power from the friendly jammers maximizing the secrecy rate. From (23), (24) , and (27), we have
By differentiating the utility in (28) with respect to p J i , we have
Rearranging the preceding equation, when (∂U s /∂p J i ) = 0, we can obtain an eighth-order polynomial equation as
where F i,l , l = 0, 1, . . . , 7 are formulas of constants A k , B k , T i,k , L i,k , and variables p J j , k = 1, 2, i ∈ N , j ∈ N but j = i. The solutions to the high-order equation (30) can be expressed in closed form, but the closed-form expressions of the solutions are extremely complex and have little necessity for our following work. Actually, our particular interest are not the closed-form expressions of the optimal jamming power solution but the parameters that affect these optimal solutions. Thus, the optimal jamming power solution of the friendly jammer J i , i ∈ N can be expressed as
which is a function of the friendly jammer J i 's asking price m i , the other friendly jammers' jamming power {p J j } j =i , and other system parameters. Note that there may be up to eight roots of the polynomial equation (30); the selected solution should be a real root and can lead to a higher value of U s in (28) than the other real ones. Subject to the power constraints 0 ≤ p J i ≤ p max in the proposed game, we can get the optimal strategy as
If there are no real roots of (30), then the optimal strategy will be either p J i_opt = 0 or p J i_opt = p max , according to which one can achieve a larger U s when other parameters are settled.
Because of the high complexity of the solutions to the highorder equation (30) , we further consider a special high interference case to obtain a simple expression of the optimal jamming power solution. In this special case, we assume that there is one friendly jammer in the system staying very close to the untrusted relay so that the interference from the friendly jammer is much stronger than the received signals from the sources at the untrusted relay. Meanwhile, we also assume that the received signal power is much higher than the noise, i.e., high SNR assumption, which means σ 2
We assume that all the left sides of these inequalities that are much smaller than 1 approach zero. Therefore, the utility function in (25) can approximately be calculated as
, and the second approximation comes from the Taylor series expansion log 2 (1 + x) ≈
x when x is small enough. It can easily be observed that if D 1 < 0, U s is a decreasing function of p J 1 . As a result, U s can be optimized when p J 1 = 0, i.e., the friendly jammer will not play in the game. If D 1 > 0, to find the optimal jamming power for the sources to buy, we can calculate
Thus, the optimal jamming power solution can be expressed as
Subject to the jamming power constraint, we can obtain the optimal jamming power solution for this special case as
In Section V, we employ the general case setups for simulations. The simulation results indicate that the sources always prefer to buy jamming power from only one friendly jammer when there exists at least one sufficiently effective friendly jammer, which is more effective to perform jamming than the other friendly jammers and is simultaneously asking for a proper price. Therefore, this special case with one friendly jammer experiencing severe interference is valid in analyzing the proposed game. Under this special case, we can get a property of the proposed game that the optimal jamming power p J * 1 is a monotonous function of the asking price m 1 , which can help to prove the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium in Section IV-D. We can also prove that the optimal jamming power p J * 1 bought by the sources is convex in the asking price m 1 under some conditions. From (35) , we have the first-order derivative of p J * 1 as
and the second-order derivative as
which indicates that in this special high interference case, the optimal jamming power p J * 1 is a convex function of the asking price m 1 .
C. Friendly Jammer Side Game
For each friendly jammer, we can define the utility function as
where c i ≥ 1 is a constant to balance the payment m i p J i from the sources and the transmission cost p J i of the friendly jammer itself. With different values of c i , the friendly jammers have different strategies for asking the prices m i , i ∈ N . Note that the jamming power p J i is also a function of the vector of asking prices (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m N ) , as the amount of the jamming power that the sources will buy also depends on the prices that the friendly jammers ask. Then, the friendly jammer side game can be expressed as
The goal of each friendly jammer as a seller is to set an optimal asking price to maximize its own utility. By differentiating the utility in (39) and setting it to zero, we have
which is equivalent to solving
Equation (42) can be solved by setting either p J i_opt = 0 or
Thus, with the optimal jamming power solution p J i_opt , we can obtain the optimal asking price solution m i_opt as a function given as
where m i_opt should be positive; otherwise, the friendly jammer J i will not participate in the game i ∈ N .
D. Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Proposed Game
In this section, we investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, at which neither the sources nor each friendly jammer can further improve its utility by changing its own strategy only. From the game definitions of the source side in (27) and the friendly jammer side in (40), we can define the Stackelberg equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1: p J i_SE and m i_SE are the Stackelberg equilibria of the proposed game if when m i is fixed
and when p J i is fixed
From the analysis in the previous two sections, we have that (44) are the optimal solutions of the jamming power needed by the sources and the asking prices given by the friendly jammers when solving the utility optimization problem in (27) and (40). Thus, we can obtain the property that the pair of
is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game. We can easily prove this property theoretically in the special high interference case with one efficient friendly jammer close to the untrusted relay. In Section IV-B, we have proved that in this special case, the optimal jamming power solution p J 1_opt is monotone decreasing and convex with the asking price m 1 when the other friendly jammers' prices are fixed. Therefore, we can obtain that there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium that is just the optimal solution of the jamming power and the asking prices. However, due to the extremely complex closedform expressions of the optimal solutions, for more general cases, the proof in theory is intractable, and thus instead, we prove by simulations in Section V that the proposed game can effectively converge to a unique Stackelberg equilibrium, which are the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking prices when maximizing the utilities of the sources and the friendly jammers.
E. Distributed Updating Algorithm
In this section, we construct a corresponding distributed updating algorithm for the proposed game to converge to the Stackelberg equilibrium defined above. By rearranging (43), we have
where m = [m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m N ] T , p J i_opt is a function of m, and I i (m) is the price updating function for friendly jammer J i , i ∈ N . The information for updating can be obtained from the sources, which is similar to the distributed power allocation scheme in [30] . The distributed updating algorithm can be expressed in vector form as
where I = [I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I N ] T is the updating function in the proposed distributed updating algorithm, and the iteration here is from time t to time t + 1. Furthermore, we can obtain the convergence of the proposed algorithm by proving that the updating function in (48) is a standard function [31] defined as follows. Similar to the situation in [31] , we can get that each friendly jammer's asking price will converge to a fixed point, i.e., the Stackelberg equilibrium in the proposed game, from any feasible initial asking price vector m(0). The positivity property of the updating function is easy to prove. We have that if the asking price m i goes up, the sources will buy less jamming power from the friendly jammer J i . Therefore, (∂p J i_opt /∂m i ) in (47) is negative, and thus, we can prove the positivity property of the updating function as
Because of the complexity of the optimal solutions in (31) and (44), the monotonicity and scalability properties of the updating function can only be shown in the special high interference case. From (35) and (47), we have
which is monotone increasing with the asking price m 1 and scalable. For more general cases, the analysis is intractable. However, in Section V, we employ the general case setups for simulations, and the simulation results show that the proposed distributed updating algorithm can converge to a unique distributed optimal solution and outperform the case without friendly jammers.
F. Centralized Scheme for Comparison
In this section, assuming that all the channel information is known by a virtual centralized controller, we formulate the centralized scheme by optimizing the secrecy rate as
where C s 1 and C s 2 can be obtained from (23) and (24), respectively. The centralized optimal solution is found by maximizing the secrecy rate only.
In Section V, we compare the proposed Stackelberg-gamebased distributed updating algorithm with this centralized scheme. From the simulation results, we can see that the distributed solution and the centralized solution are asymptotically the same, particularly when the gain factor a in (27) is sufficiently large. However, the centralized scheme needs to solve an N-arguments optimization problem that has high computational complexity. Instead, the distributed solution can be obtained through a distributed iteration process with low computational complexity. Moreover, the distributed solution only needs to update the difference of the jamming power and the asking prices to be adaptive, whereas the centralized one requires all the channel information in each data frame. Therefore, the proposed Stackelberg-game-based distributed updating algorithm is more efficient in practical applications.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To evaluate the performances, we conduct the following simulations. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we consider a two-way relay system where S 1 , S 2 , and the intermediate relay R are located at (−1, 0), (1, 0) , and (0, 0), respectively. The other simulation parameters are set up as follows: the maximum power constraint p max = 10; the transmission bandwidth W = 1; the noise variance σ 2 = 0.01; the distance-dependent path loss factor is 2; and a = 1 for the source side utility in (25) .
For the special case without friendly jammers, we set the jamming power equal to zero. Figs. 2 and 3 show the performance of the secrecy rate as a function of the two sources' transmitting power p 1 and p 2 in this special case, from which we have that the optimal power solution of (p 1 , p 2 ) is (0.22p max , p max ) when g S 1 ,R = 0.3857 and g S 2 ,R = 0.0443, and (p max , 0.32p max ) when g S 1 ,R = 0.0508 and g S 2 ,R = 0.3018. After further calculation, we see that the results agree with the optimal power solutions given in Section III.
For the single-jammer case, we consider two friendly jammer locations, i.e., (0.3, 0.4) and (0.6, 0.8). Fig. 4 shows the performance of the secrecy rate as a function of the jamming power when p 1 , p 2 , and p r are all set up to p max . We can see that with the increase of the jamming power, the secrecy rate first increases and then decreases. There indeed exists an optimal point for the jamming power. Moreover, the optimal point depends on the location of the friendly jammer, and we can find that the friendly jammer close to the untrusted relay is more effective to improve the secrecy rate. Fig. 5 shows that the optimal jamming power bought by the sources depends on the price asked by the friendly jammer. We can see that the optimal jamming power gets reduced if the asking price goes high and that the sources will even stop buying after some asking price point. Thus, there is a tradeoff for the friendly jammer to set the asking price. If the asking price is set too high, the sources will buy less jamming power or even stop buying.
For the multiple-jammer case, we consider two friendly jammers that are located at (0.3, 0.4) and (0.5, 0.5), respectively. Note that in the simulations of this scenario, the friendly jammers are both sufficiently effective jammers. Here, we define the friendly jammer J i as a sufficiently effective jammers if it on its own can offer a jamming power p J i , p J i ∈ (0, p max ], making the secrecy rate improved up to the maximum value. In Figs. 6-9 , the secrecy rate C s , the sources' utility U s , the first friendly jammer's utility U 1 , and the second friendly jammer's utility U 2 as functions of both the friendly jammers' asking prices are shown, respectively. In Fig. 6 , we can see that there exists an upper bound and a lower bound for the secrecy rate when the channel conditions are settled. When one of the two friendly jammers' asking prices is low enough, the sources can buy sufficient jamming power from the corresponding friendly jammer to improve the secrecy rate up to the upper bound. When both the friendly jammers' asking prices are beyond the sources' payment ability, the secrecy rate will stay at the lower bound, which is the same as that of the case without friendly jammers as the sources no longer buy jamming power from the friendly jammers. In Fig. 7 , we can see that if at least one of the two friendly jammers sets a low asking price, the sources' utility is high as the sources can achieve high secrecy rate at a low cost. With both the friendly jammers' asking prices going high, the sources' utility decreases. When the asking prices of both friendly jammers are so high that the sources can no longer benefit from the jamming service at such a high cost the sources will stop buying. In Figs. 8 and 9 , we can find that under this condition (i.e., both of the friendly jammers are sufficiently effective ones), the sources will always prefer to buy jamming service from only one of the friendly jammers for the best performance. The selected friendly jammer is either the one more effective to improve the secrecy rate when the asking prices of both friendly jammers are comparable or the one whose asking price is low enough. For the friendly jammer side, if a friendly jammer asks a too low price, its utility will be very low. However, if a friendly jammer asks a price that is too high, the sources might buy the jamming service from the other friendly jammer. Therefore, there is an optimal asking price for each friendly jammer, and the sources will always select the one that can provide the best performance improvement.
For the multiple-jammer case, we also discuss how the optimal secrecy rate changes with the number of friendly jammers increasing. We conduct simulations under two different scenarios, i.e., there exists at least one sufficiently effective friendly jammer, and there is no sufficiently effective friendly jammer. Here, no sufficiently effective friendly jammer means that the sources cannot achieve the maximum secrecy rate with only one friendly jammer's help. Therefore, the sources have to first sort the current friendly jammers in an order of effectiveness and then buy the jamming power from the most effective friendly jammer one by one until the secrecy rate reaches the maximum value. From (23) and (24), we have that if the channel conditions and the transmitting power of the sources and the intermediate relay are settled, the maximum achievable secrecy rate will not change, no matter how many friendly jammers are used and how much jamming power bought by the sources from each friendly jammer. For the nonsufficiently effective friendly jammer scenario, we set the friendly jammer J i located at (x i , y i ), i ∈ N , where x 2 i +y 2 i > 4. In Fig. 10 , the optimal secrecy rate as a function of the number of friendly jammers is shown. We can see that if there exists sufficiently effective friendly jammers, the optimal secrecy rate does not change as the number of friendly jammers increases. For the sources, they will always choose the most effective friendly jammer to achieve the maximum secrecy rate. In other words, in this scenario, the optimal secrecy rate can reach the maximum value with the most effective friendly jammer's help only. On the other hand, if there are no sufficiently effective friendly jammers, the optimal secrecy rate will be improved up to the maximum value as the number of friendly jammers increases. Fig. 10 . Secrecy rate versus the number of friendly jammers. Fig. 11 . Comparison between the distributed updating algorithm and the centralized scheme in terms of secrecy rate.
Finally, we compare the proposed Stackelberg-game-based distributed updating algorithm with the centralized scheme in terms of secrecy rate. Fig. 11 shows the optimal secrecy rate with the distributed updating algorithm and the centralized scheme as a function of the gain factor a in (25) with the friendly jammer located at (1, 1) . When a is large, the sources will care the gain of the secrecy rate more than the jamming service cost in the Stackelberg-game-based algorithm. We can see that the performance gap between the distributed updating algorithm and the centralized scheme in terms of the optimal secrecy rate shrinks as a increases. Moreover, the performances are asymptotically the same when a is sufficiently large.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the physical layer security issue for two-way relay communications with an untrusted intermediate relay and friendly jammers. As a special case, the two-way relay system without friendly jammers was first studied. In this special case, we indicated that a nonzero secrecy rate for the two-way untrusted relay system is indeed available and further derived the optimal transmitting power of the two sources maximizing the secrecy rate. As for the two-way relay system with friendly jammers, we first found that the secrecy rate can be effectively improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers and then formulated a Stackelberg game between the sources and the friendly jammers to solve the optimization problem in a distributed manner. From the simulation results, we can see the efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg-game-based distributed updating algorithm, which has similar performance but much lower computational complexity compared with the centralized scheme.
